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A Response to Professor Robert E. Park's 
"Giving Meaning to the Constitution: 
Competing Visions of Judicial Review" 
By 
J. Clay Snith, Jr.* 
Professor Park has provided us with a provocative and enlightened 
exposition in his paper entitled, "Giving ~aning to the Cbnstitution: 
Canpeting Visions of Judicial Review." 
The question is : What theme has been offered by the speaker for in-
tellectual consumption? 
One theme is central to Professor Park's presentation: that there 
ought to be a nexus between the will of the people and the disposition of 
case and controversies decided by the United States Supreme Cburt. 
Professor Park names this thane, or describes this thane as 
"super-majori tarianism ••• , a new standard for validating or legitimatizing 
constitutional interpretations" during judicial review. S176 
I will return to the nexus between the will of the people and judicial 
review shortly after I hopefully, properly sUlllJlarize how Professor Park 
arrives at "super-majoritarianism" as a legitimate standard for judicial 
review. 
Professor Park attempts to lay the foundation for "supermajoritarianism" 
by coomenting on Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall's Mauri, Hawaii, speech, in 
which Marshall concluded that the Cbnsti tution, when adopted, made it an 
imperfect, indeed, a flawed document. 
*Following Professor Robert E. Park's paper presented at the Twelfth Annual 
Meeting of the District of Oolmnbia Court of Appeals Judicial Conference on 
June 12, 1987, J. Clay Sni th , Jr., Dean of Howard Uni versi ty School of law, 
responded. Professor Park is a member of the law faculty at George Washington 
University School of Law. 
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Professor Park concedes that "Justice Marshall did the nation an 
~portant service in reminding [the nation] that the treatment of slavery 
by the founding fathers constitutes a continuing blot on the history of 
the constititional convention. ~8 
Professor Park then closes in on Marshall's language that liThe Consti-
tution [is] a living document" interpreting Marshall's criticisns as sub-
stantial justice. As a matter of substantive justice, Professor Park has 
no objection to Marshall's speech. 
However, as a matter of "constitutional analysis, constitutional 
reasoning," Professor Park, recognizing that other distinguished scholars -
indeed the majority of them -- hold Marshall's "popular" view, says that 
Marshall presents a "highly controversial theory of how we should interpret 
the Constitution." ~9 
Throughout his paper, Professor Park stalks the question: "do we have 
a living Constitution?" He pokes and tugs at the question because, fran my 
point of view, he is very uncomfortable with all standards of judicial 
review accepted as legi tima te by the majority of jurisprudents today. 
Professor Park is very deferential to his peers and bends over back-
wards not to offend. However, like an ordinary scholar in the jungle of 
ideas, his intellectual guerilla warfare results in casualties. Word 
has it that three theoretical standards of judicial review have fallen 
in Professor Park's classroom of ideas at George WaShington Law School, 
where he teaches. 
Casual ty One. Original Intent. 
This theme emphasizes that the Cbnstitution is a legal document, and 
analogizes it to other legal documents, like contracts and wills. Professor 
Park a~s his intellectual gun at original intent and strikes a telling 
blow to this theme because he believes it has "severe constraint upon the 
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use of judicial power. It ~83 .1 Rather, Professor Park suggests that It the 
original language must become increasingly merely a starting point. It '137 
NOt without reservations, he concludes that "the evidence of [original] 
intent is ••• fragmented [even] thin ••• It '140 
casual ty Tv.o. The Instrtmlental (or Political) Consti tution. 
This theme, he says, uses constitutional law for a judicial political 
agenda; it is not neutral, but result-oriented. '83.3 Why doesn't 
Professor Park like this one? He says that the Instrumentalists "bring to 
constitutional law ••• a ••• set of preferred outcomes ••• and [their] 
values are bent to serve these outcanes.1t '149 
Casual ty Three. The Moral Constitution 
The moralist barely escapes the academic machine gun of Professor 
Park. The moral Consti tution " treats consi tutional inquiry as moral 
inquiry:" a moral mandate, and discounts procedure, legal coherence, 
precedents and logic, and stands as a bare assertion, says Professor 
Park. ~'83.4, 123 
Surviving: The Living Constitution 
The only surviving prisoner of Professor Park's acadanic war is the 
Living Constitution, the one that Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall referred 
to in his Mauri, Hawaii, speech. Y13 The Living (bnsti tution anphasizes 
the inescapability of change, and perceives the Constitution as the focal 
point of what is, at least by analogy, a continuing constitutional con-
vention. '83.2 Professor Park also draws on the words of Mr. Justice 
William Brennan as falling under the Living {bnsti tution umbrella. '12 
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Let's return to the standard of judicial review offered by Professor 
Park. In reading his paper, one must constantly keep their eyes on the 
noble objective of its author: he seeks a new standard of judicial re-
view tenned .. super-majori tarianism of American Sovereignty" invol ving 
the interpretation of the United States Constitution. ~4l 
What method or logic does Professor Park utilize to reach his conclu-
sion that there should be a nexus between court decisions and the will of 
the people? 
First, he points our attention to the fact that some of the Framers 
of the Constitution such as Randolph, insisted that the ratification should 
be referred to the people (~l5), as opposed to Cbngress or the state. 
Secondly, he points to the Tenth Amendment that the implied sovereignty 
resides in the states, the political unit nearest the people. 
Thirdly, he points to the Amendment Process which requires ratification 
by 3/4 of the states. 
These references to constitutional history seem to be the gravamen of 
Professor Park's theory of "super-majoritarianisn." 
Professor Park points his magnifying glass at the Constitution and con-
cludes that the Constitution is a body of words fran which few rules can be 
drawn without interpretation. He rightly concludes that much of the con-
stitutional law is unwritten. 
The people live by and are affected by the unwritten Constitution. 
Park asks: How can the gap, the ambiguities, the meaning of the words 
in the Cbnstitution, be made legitimate to the people of the nation? 
Indeed, how can our instrument of rule, the Constitution, be authoritative? 
The answer is that the language of the Cl:>nsti tution, its words and 
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phrases, its dashes and dots, are authoritative, if their interpretation 
is canalized, wi thin bounds of legitimate interpretation. 
Again, I remind you that Professor Park has a stated goal in his paper 
and that beckons us to consider "super-majoritarianism" as a standard for 
judicial review of constitutional claims. I get the feeling, even with 
the deference paid to traditional, or popular standards of judicial review, 
that such standards do not satisfy Professor Park's test of legitimacy, 
or authenticity. (,-44) In fact, the unstated rumblings in his paper may 
even suggest that modern standards of judicial review of constitutional 
claims are authoritarian. These rumblings are heard via his words which 
indirectly ask where do judges get the power, if there is any, to rein-
terpret, to recast and to refonn the Constitution of the United States? '138 
It sounds like an Edward Meese or Judge Robert Bark question, but Professor 
Park would assure us, I think, that he is not in that analytical camp. 
What then is the vision of Professor Park concernig judicial review? 
What makes the analysis of constitutional interpretation authentic to or 
legit~te for h~? 
Professor Park could be satisfied with the following six criteria: 
1) It should be plainly grounded in the constitutional text. 
2) It should set limits to judicial decisions. 3) It should not 
frustrate the need for legit~te constitutional adaptation and 
innovation. 4) It should be consistent with the democratic 
values and the scheme of federalism implicit in the Cbnstit~ 
tion. 5) It should be usable by judges deciding real cases 
on real facts over genuine and heated constitutional controversies. 
6) It should constitute a plausible use of the Constitution to 
the legal profession and to the people of the United States. 
(Y46, f128) (emphasis added) 
On its face, the test suggested by Professor Park is neither new or 
novel, except, consistent with his general theme of II super-majori tiarianism" 
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he adds, in criteria six language which states that the standard of judi-
cial review is legitimate if it" consti tutes a plausible use of the Consti-
tution ••• to the people of the United States." <'46) 
I sense another rumbling fram Professor Park: the people of the nation 
must believe that the analytical process used by the Federal Courts is 
plausible to them as opposed to Ita professional elite". <'56) Hence, the 
judicial review becanes legitimate only if accepted by the people, the 
II super-majori tarians • II 
Pursuing his theme of II super-majori tarianism, II Professor Park argues 
that the issue of legitimacy would be not an issue at all if the analytical 
meaning of the <l:>nsti tution came from the people. In fact, he II implies that 
the meaning of the document canes fran outside the Constitution ••• II From 
whom does analytical meaning come? Again, Professor Park responds: the 
people. Apparently, he thinks that the judiciary should be as accountable 
to the people as is the executive and legislative branches of government. 
(~163-66) But, doesn't such a notion collide with Hamilton's Federalist 
Paper No. 78, calling for an independent judiciary? The Federalist 502, 504 
(The Modern Library Ed. n.d.). I think it does. Hamilton would, I am 
sure agree with me. Professor Park disagrees. ~~180, 181 
I think that we should press Professor Park for an answer to this 
question: How many people in the nation are qualified to provide the U. S. 
Supreme <l:>urt with analytical advice in deciding cases? 
Under the II super-majori tarianism" standard of judicial review, prior 
to a vote on a case, should the Court ask the pollster what the views are 
of the super-majority? Should what the people say matter to the <l:>urt? 
Professor Park himself is sensitive to a criteria for judicial review 
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that is so restrictive that the courts employ pollsters as law clerks to 
analyze a decision prior to its release. Y70 
Professor Park Justifies his thesis by an analogous reference to the 
requirement of 3/4 of the states to ratifying the Oonstitution. 
I think we've deter:mined exactly what Professor Park is after by his 
analogy: 3/4 of the people must constitute a national super-majority to 
validate, authenticate and legitimize a "plausible use of the Oonstitution" 
by the Cburts. (Y46, '47) 
I'm sure that my interpretation of Professor Park's thesis is correct 
because he wants his position understood. Using Brown v. Board of Education 
as an example, Professor Park states that the constitutional analysis and 
reasoning of Brown was supported by a changing national value as to equality." 
(Y67) He states that the majority of the people were willing to accept 
racial equality as a national value; hence, the decision was a "plausible 
use of the Cbnstitution." Professor Park validates the public's acceptance 
by referring to Chief Justice Earl Warren's memoirs "that the Cburt received 
relatively little mail after the Brown decision, in contrast to same other 
cases /' (~67) 
The people may have accepted the principle of equality in the abstract, 
but certainly not in the appliciation of Brown. Professor Park doesn't 
provide much guidance on the difference between "plausible use of the 
Cbnstitution" as opposed to application. (~186) 
For many Americans, equality in the abstract is akin to Kirkegaard' s 
analogy of giving a cookbook to a hungry man. I su1:mit that the legion of 
cases following Brown, among them Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U. S. 1, 18 (1954) 
fully support my view. 
· . 
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I think that we owe Professor Park's offer that we consider another 
element of judicial review serious consideration: if not for to praise 
hUn for his assertions than for to bury h~ for making them. 
Before closing, as Professor Park himself has pointed out: as a 
populous he can live with the ~ving Constitutionalist. Their reasoning 
is "attractive" to him as a matter of judicial governance. (11"170) But 
Park remains skeptical. Why? He wants the judge's presumption as to 
constitutional values to be at least three fourths of the values of the 
people. If tba t quota isn't reached -- under the super-majori tarianisn 
standard of judicial review - the decision of the court is not legi tima te. 
I commend Professor Park for his thought-provoking paper. 
Ladies and gentlemen! I now return the podium to the people of the 
United States -- Professor Robert E. Park. 
